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THE	  UNCERTAIN	  FUTURE	  OF	  “HOT	  NEWS”	  
MISAPPROPRIATION	  AFTER	  BARCLAYS	  CAPITAL	  V.	  
THEFLYONTHEWALL.COM	  
	  
Shyamkrishna	  Balganesh*	  
INTRODUCTION:	  THE	  “GHOSTLY	  PRESENCE”	  OF	  INS	  V.	  AP	  
 Ever since its genesis in the Supreme Court’s famous decision in 
International News Service v. Associated Press,1 the “hot news” 
misappropriation doctrine has had to fight for its survival. First came Judge 
Learned Hand, who in a series of opinions, took the position that International 
News did not lay down a “general doctrine,” but was instead meant to be 
limited to the peculiarities of the newspaper industry.2 Next came the Court’s 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, where it abrogated all “federal 
general common law,” the very body of law within which the hot news 
misappropriation doctrine had been developed.3 The doctrine then appeared to 
have been resuscitated in 1997, when the Second Circuit breathed new life into 
it as a part of New York’s state common law in NBA v. Motorola, Inc.4 
Finding that the doctrine had managed to “survive,” the court in that case 
sought to develop it into a viable cause of action, and parsed it into its 
constituent elements.5 Other courts seemed to then follow the Second Circuit’s 
lead on this.6 
Most recently, the Second Circuit, in Barclays Capital Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com effectively reconsidered its decision in NBA, albeit in 
relation to different subject matter, and in so doing narrowed the doctrine even 
further.7 In its decision, the court paid close attention to the language and 
 
* Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  School.	  
1. 248	  U.S.	  215	  (1918).	  
2. See,	  e.g.,	  Cheney	  Bros.	  v.	  Doris	  Silk	  Corp.,	  35	  F.2d	  279,	  280	  (2d	  Cir.	  1929).	  
3. 304	  U.S.	  64,	  79	  (1938).	  
4. 105	  F.3d	  841	  (2d	  Cir.	  1997).	  
5. Id.	  at	  843	  (holding	  “narrow	  ‘hot	  news’	  exception	  does	  survive	  preemption”).	  
6. See,	   e.g.,	   Associated	   Press	   v.	   All	   Headline	   News	   Corp.,	   608	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   454,	   459	  
(S.D.N.Y.	   2009)	   (recognizing	  NBA	   v.	   Motorola	   as	   maintaining	   hot	   news	   misappropriation	  
cause	   of	   action);	   X17,	   Inc.	   v.	   Lavandeira,	   563	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1102,	   1105–07	   (C.D.	   Cal.	   2007)	  
(concluding	   that	   California	   too	   recognizes	   hot	   news	  misappropriation	   as	   set	   out	   in	  NBA);	  
Scranton	  Times,	  L.P.	   v.	  Wilkes-­‐Barre	  Pub.	  Co.,	   2009	  WL	  3100963,	   at	   *5	   (M.D.	  Pa.,	   Sep.	  23,	  
2009)	  (agreeing	  with	  Second	  Circuit’s	  interpretation	  in	  NBA).	  
7. 650	  F.3d	  876	  (2d	  Cir.	  2011).	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statements of the Supreme Court in International News, which it parsed in 
great detail, while at the same time underemphasizing the peculiarities of the 
situation that had prompted the Court in International News to choose the 
framework that it did. In the end, its decision did surprisingly little to clarify 
the scope, structure, or indeed analytical basis of the hot news doctrine. The 
decision however does send an important signal to future litigants: that the hot 
news doctrine is today an unviable stand-alone claim in all but a very few 
situations. 
In this Essay, I attempt to disaggregate the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Barclays Capital to show that while the court may have reached the right 
conclusion in the end (a position I have argued for previously8), its reasoning 
to reach that conclusion is rather confusing, while at the same time a rich 
source of information about the future of hot news doctrine. At every stage of 
its analysis, the Second Circuit went to significant lengths to cabin the reach of 
the doctrine quite considerably, despite reiterating that it was not abrogating it 
altogether. In analyzing the opinion, I thus consider the possibility that the 
court may have been signaling the gradual demise of the doctrine, which as a 
creature of the common law must go through a fuller process of desuetude 
before being officially “overruled.” Part I sets out the sources of confusion, 
doubt, and disagreement that characterize the court’s two opinions in Barclays 
Capital. Part II then attempts to draw lessons from the Second Circuit’s 
opinion for the future of common law intellectual property and the use of the 
common law process in developing intellectual property rules.	  
I.	  DOUBT,	  DENIAL,	  AND	  DISAGREEMENT:	  THE	  SECOND	  CIRCUIT	  DECISION	  	  
The facts of Barclays Capital v. Theflyonthewall.com were somewhat 
unexceptional for the Internet age. The plaintiffs were financial services firms 
engaged in the business of generating extensive research about the activities 
and prospects of numerous publicly traded companies, which they provided to 
their clients for a fee. Each morning, they produced their research reports, 
which summarized their findings and contained daily recommendations as to 
“the wisdom of purchasing, holding, or selling securities” of various 
companies that formed the subject of the research.9 The defendant website was 
a subscription news service. Through various means, the defendant obtained 
the plaintiffs’ research reports, and then posted the recommendations carried 
therein on its own website exclusively for its own subscribers. Each day, this 
occurred before the plaintiffs made their reports and recommendations 
available to the general public, but after the plaintiffs released their reports to 
their own subscribers. Most importantly though, in posting the plaintiffs’ 
recommendations, the defendant always attributed the recommendations to 
their source, i.e., plaintiffs, since the value and credibility of the 
recommendations emanated entirely from the plaintiff firms’ expertise.10 
 
8. Shyamkrishna	  Balganesh,	  “Hot	  News”:	  The	  Enduring	  Myth	  of	  Property	  in	  News,	  111	  
Colum.	  L.	  Rev.	  419,	  475–76	  (2011)	  [hereinafter	  Balganesh,	  “Hot	  News”].	  
9. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  879.	  
10. Id.	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Worried that the defendant’s actions would impact their business model, 
the plaintiffs commenced an action under federal copyright law and New 
York’s hot news misappropriation doctrine against the defendant website. At 
trial, the defendant readily conceded copyright infringement, but disputed that 
its actions amounted to a misappropriation of hot news.11 After a bench trial, 
the district court found for the plaintiffs, and the defendant then appealed.12 
As many predicted, on appeal the Second Circuit reversed. Yet, its path in 
getting there was far from simple. Its reasoning seemed to be characterized by 
an uneasiness with the hot news doctrine as a whole, coupled with its belief 
that its prior opinion resurrecting International News, i.e., its opinion in NBA, 
had added to the confusion. To complicate matters even further, the panel 
disagreed on its understanding of “free-riding” and “competition,” resulting in 
one judge (Judge Raggi) writing a separate concurrence. In what follows, I 
attempt to disaggregate these various influences on the court’s reasoning. 
A. Doubt 
It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the Second Circuit—both 
majority and concurrence—approached the hot news doctrine with a dubitante 
mindset. A traditional “dubitante” opinion is one where a judge is unhappy 
with a proposition of law, but remains unwilling for some reason to repudiate 
it.13 To be sure, the majority in Barclays Capital commenced its discussion by 
observing that it was not addressing the viability of the doctrine, and that it was 
“without the authority” to repudiate it. Nonetheless, it went on to add that if it 
were called upon to reconsider the doctrine it might have certified the issue to 
the state court, thereby suggesting that it was not at the same time expressly 
affirming the viability of the doctrine in refusing to discuss the issue.14 
Additionally, in their substantive discussions of the doctrine, both opinions 
went to some length to lay out what they perceived to be major problems with 
the doctrine. 
Given its reluctance (or inability) to examine the viability of the doctrine, 
the court chose to focus on the question of federal copyright preemption. 
Specifically, it came to focus its attention on the “extra elements” test—
whether the doctrine added a dimension to the entitlement beyond the rights 
covered by copyright law, for it to survive preemption.15 And here, both 
opinions registered their most obvious doubts with the doctrine. 
The majority began by noting how International News, despite its having 
little value as precedent after Erie, nonetheless exerted a good deal of influence 
on the structure of the doctrine, since the court in NBA had consciously 
structured the New York version of the doctrine around International News.16 
 
11. Id.	  at	  880.	  
12. For	   the	   district	   court’s	   opinion,	   see	   Barclays	   Capital	   Inc.	   v.	   Theflyonthewall.com,	  
700	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  310	  (S.D.N.Y.	  2010).	  
13. See	  Lon	  Fuller,	  Anatomy	  of	  the	  Law	  147	  (1968);	  Jason	  J.	  Czarnezki,	  The	  Dubitante	  
Opinion,	  39	  Akron	  L.	  Rev.	  1,	  2	  (2006).	  
14. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  890.	  
15. Id.	  at	  893–98.	  
16. Id.	  at	  894.	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The problem with this “ghostly” influence of International News on the 
doctrine, to the court, lay in its emphasis on the moral dimension of the 
defendant’s actions, which the Supreme Court had dubbed “unfair” and as 
amounting to reaping without sowing.17 Over the years, this rhetoric had come 
to be absorbed by various courts, resulting in the gradual expansion of the 
doctrine. This emphasis on unfairness came to influence the preemption 
analysis too, despite its being irrelevant to the issue since it did not add a 
substantive extra element to the analysis in any way. Additionally, on the issue 
of preemption, the majority also worried that allowing anything other than a 
very narrowly tailored hot news doctrine would disrupt Congress’s desire to 
ensure national uniformity in intellectual property law. The hot news doctrine, 
the court worried, might result in states recognizing and enforcing it to varying 
degrees, producing a good deal of uncertainty and “patchwork protection” that 
was avoidable.18 On the face of things, the majority opinion sets this concern 
up as a matter of construction. In practical terms though, the court was using it 
to reiterate its doubts about the viability of the doctrine outside a very limited 
domain. 
Judge Raggi’s concurring opinion made these early doubts rather explicit. 
In her view, the hot news doctrine, as formulated by the court in NBA, failed to 
identify any extra elements that were qualitatively different from copyright 
law. Nonetheless, much like the majority, she concluded that she was bound by 
the prior opinion and proceeded accordingly.19 
Both opinions therefore began their discussion with a good deal of 
skepticism about the doctrine—both structural and substantive, while 
acknowledging their inability to repudiate the doctrine. It was thus in some 
sense inevitable (and predictable) that this constrained skepticism (i.e., the 
dubitante mindset) would deeply influence their construction and application 
of the doctrine, while forcing them to preserve it nominally for the future. 
B. Denial 
Having begun with a discernible degree of skepticism about the doctrine, 
the majority opinion then proceeded to make sense of hot news 
misappropriation as formulated by the court in NBA. And here too, the court 
expressed its misgivings. In NBA, the court had attempted to parse the 
language and logic of International News to formulate a version of the 
misappropriation doctrine for New York that consisted of five independent 
elements. Indeed, it went to some length to describe the analytical bases of 
each element and then root them individually in the language of International 
News. The court in Barclays Capital however found this entire exercise 
redundant, and additionally found a simple way to disregard it: by 
characterizing it as dictum. 
In NBA the court eventually found for the defendant. Yet before doing so, 
it set out the constituent elements of a hot news misappropriation claim—
 
17. Id.	  at	  894–95.	  
18. Id.	  at	  898.	  
19. Id.	  at	  908–11	  (Raggi,	  J.,	  concurring).	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twice—then proceeded to describe how these elements satisfied the copyright 
preemption analysis, and only thereafter applied the elements to the facts of the 
dispute before it.20 To the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital however, this 
represented both a redundancy and a deep inconsistency. The court concluded 
that the five-element test of NBA was not at all essential to the court’s 
conclusion, and despite NBA’s characterization of the test as its “hold[ing],” 
the court now characterized it as dictum.21 Additionally, the court also found 
the two versions of the five-element test that the NBA court had laid down to 
exhibit a variation in that one quoted language from International News that 
seemed to modify how the elements might be applied.22 Putting these two 
moves together strategically allowed the court in Barclays Capital to at once 
both disregard the elements of the action as formulated in NBA and at the same 
time choose those parts of the opinion in NBA that it found most conducive to 
its views on the future of the action, by identifying what it thought to be the 
real holding of the NBA decision. To the court, the real holding of NBA lay in 
its preemption analysis, and its finding that the defendant in that case 
(Motorola) was not free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts.23 
While this was no doubt an interesting bit of legal maneuvering, it reveals 
an obvious tension within the majority’s opinion. Recall that the majority had 
begun its discussion by noting that it was powerless to repudiate the doctrine 
because it was “bound” by the NBA court’s statements that the doctrine 
survives.24 Yet in relation to the five-element test, the majority was willing to 
characterize those portions of the very same opinion (i.e., NBA) as dictum in 
order to deny its binding nature. If the five-part analysis was nothing more than 
a “sophisticated observation[] in aid”25 of the court’s analysis of preemption, 
and therefore not integral to its actual conclusions, why could the same not be 
said of the NBA court’s general observation that the doctrine survives in New 
York, since in the end it concluded that the plaintiff’s claim there was 
nonetheless preempted? In other words, if the five-element analysis was 
peripheral to the preemption issue, so too should have been the question of the 
doctrine’s “survival.” It is indeed here that the court tips its hand to reveal that 
it is in reality trying to consciously constrain the doctrine. 
It is important to note that the concurring opinion categorically refused to 
buy this logic. Judge Raggi remained unwilling to go along with the majority’s 
categorization of the five-part test as dictum and adopted the position that the 
test was “necessary to the opinion’s result.”26 
C. Disagreement 
In denying that the test as formulated by NBA was binding precedent, the 
majority opinion in Barclays Capital thus effectively rejected the hot news 
 
20. NBA	  v.	  Motorola	  Inc.,	  105	  F.3d	  841,	  845,	  852	  (2d	  Cir.	  1997).	  
21. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  898–99.	  
22. Id.	  at	  900–01.	  
23. Id.	  at	  901–02.	  
24. Id.	  at	  890.	  
25. Id.	  at	  901.	  
26. Id.	  at	  911	  (Raggi,	  J.,	  concurring)	  (emphasis	  added).	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doctrine as formulated there, i.e., the five-factor test. Yet, neither did the court 
offer its own independent formulation of the doctrine as an alternative. The 
majority opinion instead moved to stating and applying what it thought to be 
the real holding in NBA: that there was no “free-riding” by the defendant, as a 
result of which the claim was effectively preempted by copyright law.27 
The portion of the NBA opinion that the majority thought itself to be 
bound by was limited to the court’s holding that the element of “free-riding” 
by a defendant was necessary for a hot news claim to survive federal 
preemption. In NBA, the court had found that the defendant was not free-riding 
on the plaintiff’s efforts because it had collected its facts (i.e., the material 
sought to be protected) on its own, using “[its] own resources,” and thereupon 
found the plaintiff’s hot news claim preempted.28 Seizing on this, the majority 
in Barclays Capital reasoned that since the plaintiff firms were not in the 
business of merely transmitting recommendations, but were instead actively 
making them, while the defendant website was merely transmitting these 
recommendations with attribution to its subscribers, the defendant was in 
similar vein not free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts. Had the plaintiff been in 
the business of also transmitting information, that it was not itself producing, 
to its subscribers, the court concluded it would have been willing to find free-
riding.29 
Simple as this reasoning may seem, it masks several complexities 
underlying the very idea of free-riding. The majority in Barclays Capital 
placed much emphasis on the idea of “acquiring material” that the Supreme 
Court had used in describing the hot news claim in International News.30 
Creation, the court reasoned now, was different from acquisition—implying 
that while the defendant’s behavior might amount to free-riding in some 
general sense, it was not an act of free-riding on the acquisitive efforts of the 
plaintiff. While this may certainly be true as an analytical matter, it is not clear 
from the court’s reasoning why this limitation ought to matter much in the 
law’s understanding of free-riding. Why, in other words, is the acquisitive 
effort more worthy of protection than the creative effort? The answer cannot 
simply be that it is copyright law’s prerogative to protect creativity, since we 
are by necessity in the realm of non-expressive information (i.e., ideas, facts, 
data) that is by definition outside the domain of copyright law. The court 
sought its answer instead in the language of International News, which it 
mined in some detail, and in the process focused on the Supreme Court’s 
observation that the plaintiff’s profits in that case were being diverted “at the 
point” when they were to be reaped, to conclude that this was absent here, 
revealing an absence of free-riding.31 That the court in Barclays Capital felt a 
good deal of discomfort with its approach is adequately borne out in its 
observation at the end of its attempted mining of International News, that it 
was doing so not to treat International News as a “statement of law,” but 
 
27. Id.	  at	  902–06.	  
28. NBA	  v.	  Motorola,	  Inc.,	  105	  F.3d	  841,	  854	  (1997).	  
29. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  905–06.	  
30. Id.	  at	  903.	  
31. International	  News	  Service	  v.	  Associated	  Press,	  248	  U.S.	  215,	  240	  (1918).	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instead to focus on the differences between that case and the present one.32 In 
effect, the Court avoided answering a rather fundamental question about the 
nature of “free riding” on which it placed all its normative emphasis. 
As I have argued before, the idea of free-riding in International News had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the distinction between an acquisition and 
creation.33 It originated instead from the context of the problem that the Court 
was trying to solve there: a collective action problem. The free-riding thus was 
not about the nature of the plaintiff’s actions that the defendant was relying on, 
but instead about the fact that it was enabling the defendant to be enriched at 
the plaintiff’s expense. This enrichment in turn was problematic because it 
diminished parties’ incentives to enter into a collective enterprise that 
necessitated continued cooperation for its functioning. The key to Barclays 
Capital was thus the complete absence of a collective action problem, not the 
absence of an enrichment at one party’s expense. The majority’s distinction 
between “making” the recommendations and “breaking” them to the public 
would have been better served by focusing on the absence of direct 
competition. 
Judge Raggi’s concurring opinion seemed to be headed in the right 
direction when she disagreed with the majority’s reliance on free-riding and 
focused instead on the element of direct competition. Noting, in no uncertain 
terms, that she was not convinced by the majority’s acquisition/creation 
distinction, since the plaintiffs seemed to be performing both roles, she 
eventually found the plaintiff’s claim to be preempted owing to the absence of 
any direct competition between the parties.34 Nonetheless, her opinion does 
little to define the idea of direct competition or indeed situate it within the 
overall skein of what the doctrine is trying to achieve. The opinion 
simplistically notes that “direct competition is the substantial similarity of the 
products in satisfying the relevant market demand.”35 And again, much like 
the majority opinion, Judge Raggi’s opinion too placed much emphasis on the 
fact that the defendant was attributing the recommendations to the plaintiff—
which it took to indicate the absence of direct competition between them. 
Direct competition was indeed the key to the issue in Barclays Capital. 
Yet, it involved more than just the question of demand substitution. What the 
Court in International News was really focusing on in its discussion of 
competition was hardly just the final products/services of the parties, but 
instead their position vis-à-vis each other as “competitors.” This distinction is 
more than just theoretical. What rendered the defendant’s free-riding an act of 
unjust enrichment in International News was the reality that it allowed the 
defendant to obtain a competitive advantage at the plaintiff’s expense—one 
that could have had the long term effect of jeopardizing the very structure of 
newsgathering, if left unchecked. The only thing that seemed to keep Judge 
Raggi from finding direct competition between the parties then was the fact 
 
32. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  905.	  
33. See	  Balganesh,	   “Hot	  News,”	   supra	  note	  8,	  at	  438–71	  (framing	  question	   instead	   in	  
terms	  of	  unjust	  enrichment	  and	  unfair	  competition).	  
34. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  912–15	  (Raggi,	  J.,	  concurring).	  
35. Id.	  at	  913.	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that the plaintiff was doing no more than disseminating its own 
recommendations, instead of also carrying those of other research firms as 
well. In the end, her reasoning thus boiled down to essentially the same 
acquisition/creation distinction that the majority had relied on. 
* * * 
The Barclays Capital opinions are thus replete with observations hinting 
at the court’s skepticism with the hot news misappropriation doctrine. In many 
ways, the court seemed do all but actually repudiate the doctrine. It declared 
the five-factor formulation from NBA non-binding, repeatedly emphasized the 
extremely “narrow” nature of the doctrine, admonished courts for expanding 
the doctrine by placing too much emphasis on the idea of “unfair[ness],” and 
finally relied heavily on an understanding of “free-riding” that seems largely 
conclusory and certainly incapable of meaningful replication in the future. To 
its credit though, not once did the court in Barclays Capital use the phrase 
“property” to describe the interest at stake, unlike in the NBA opinion, where 
the court sought to categorically alter Justice Pitney’s original understanding of 
the doctrine.36 But why then did the court not take one small step more, and 
abrogate the doctrine altogether, when its distaste for the doctrine and its 
generativity seemed more than apparent?  One suspects that the answer lies in 
the gradual process by which a common law doctrine comes to be overruled, 
which the court was likely signaling in no small measure. 
In dissenting from the majority opinion in a major antitrust case a few 
years ago, Justice Breyer described the common law process of overruling as 
one where a court would “issue decisions that gradually eroded the scope and 
effect of the rule in question, which might eventually lead the courts to put the 
rule to rest.”37 Gradual narrowing and asphyxiation of a doctrine over time 
such that it comes to be applied and relied on by parties with rarity—and 
thereby falls into desuetude—is thus a precondition to its actual 
repudiation/abrogation. Two reasons motivate this approach. The first is the 
incrementalism inherent in the formulation of the rule, a tentativeness that 
allows the process to remain sensitive to changes in the context within which 
the rule is likely to be applied. The second is the principle of stare decisis, 
which, while not always binding as a rule, nonetheless constrains later courts 
from straying from their previous decisions unless absolutely necessary, and 
demands that courts try and reconcile any changes that they make to the 
doctrine with their previous decisions. In many ways both these influences 
seemed to be at play in Barclays Capital. 
The hot news doctrine had evolved as a solution to a problem very 
specific to the newspaper industry—a fact recognized soon after the doctrine, 
and alluded to by the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital as well. Yet over 
time, the doctrine had come to be expanded and applied to new contexts and 
subject matter, in the process detaching it from its moorings in the newspaper 
 
36. See	  Balganesh,	  “Hot	  News,”	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  423	  (explaining	  original	  formulation	  of	  
hot	  news	  doctrine).	  
37. Leegin	   Creative	   Leather	   Prods.,	   Inc.	   v.	   PSKS,	   Inc.,	   127	   S.	   Ct.	   2705,	   2737	   (2007)	  
(Breyer,	  J.,	  dissenting).	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industry and converting it into a stand-alone cause of action. In rolling it back, 
the court thus had to be sensitive to the expectations that this expansion—
problematic as it may have been—had likely created among actors. The court 
was also explicit about its reliance on stare decisis, and as discussed above, 
went to some lengths to limit the applicability of the principle, while at least 
nominally adhering to it. In short then, the need for gradualism was readily 
apparent in the court’s approach. 
From this perspective, the opinions in Barclays Capital can be seen as 
signaling to litigants and lower courts the impending repudiation of hot news 
misappropriation. Despite the court’s recognition of a narrow set of cases 
where the action might still survive,38 its repudiation of the five-factor formula 
and its extended focus on the question of preemption makes it highly likely 
that even if a future case meeting the court’s criteria should arise, it might not 
survive the close scrutiny that the court insists all hot news claims be subjected 
to. Things might have indeed been much clearer (and perhaps more helpful), if 
the court had made explicit its intentions, rather than forcing them to be 
gleaned ex post. All the same, it must be remembered that the common law 
develops through what a court actually does rather than what it merely says, a 
reality that the Barclays Capital court seems to have affirmed in more ways 
than one. 
 
II.	  LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF COMMON LAW INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
 Taking a step back now from the specifics of the decision in Barclays 
Capital, it is worth considering what the court’s approach and the reasoning it 
employed to reach its conclusions in that case mean for the future of common 
law intellectual property—an area of law that I have previously argued 
embodies an underappreciated source of flexibility and pragmatism.39 While 
Barclays Capital may have sounded the beginning of the end for the hot news 
misappropriation doctrine, I believe that its lessons for common law 
intellectual property lawmaking are, by contrast, ones of optimism. In this Part, 
I consider two in particular. 
A. The Virtues of Caution 
Contrasting the language and tone of the Second Circuit’s opinion in NBA 
to that of its most recent one in Barclays Capital reveals a noticeable 
difference. In declaring that the hot news doctrine had indeed survived in New 
York, and adapting it to the modern environment, the court in NBA sounds 
 
38. Barclays	  Capital,	  650	  F.3d	  at	  905–06	  (“If	  a	  Firm	  were	  to	  collect	  and	  disseminate	  .	  .	  .	  
facts	  about	  securities	  recommendations	  in	  the	  brokerage	  industry	  (including,	  perhaps,	  such	  
facts	   it	   generated	   itself	   .	   .	   .),	   and	   were	   Fly	   to	   copy	   the	   facts	   contained	   in	   the	   Firm’s	  
hypothetical	  service,	  it	  might	  be	  liable	  .	  .	  .	  on	  a	  ‘hot-­‐news’	  misappropriation	  theory.”)	  
39. See	   Shyamkrishna	   Balganesh,	   The	   Pragmatic	   Incrementalism	   of	   Common	   Law	  
Intellectual	   Property,	   63	   Vand.	   L.	   Rev.	   1543,	   1545–46	   (2010)	   [hereinafter	   Balganesh,	  
Pragmatic	  Incrementalism]	  (claiming	  skepticism	  of	  pragmatic	  incrementalism	  of	  intellectual	  
property	  law	  is	  “myopic”).	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optimistic, proactive, and willing to see where the doctrine is likely to head in 
the future. NBA was decided just around the time that the Internet era began to 
come into its own. Nearly a decade and a half later, the court’s tone in 
Barclays Capital is markedly different: skeptical, risk-averse, and perhaps 
most importantly reactive. 
Yet reactive to what exactly? In the time since the doctrine’s resurrection 
in NBA, much had indeed changed in the information environment. The 
Internet and the emergence of digital technology had resulted in a variety of 
changes to traditional intellectual property—i.e., copyright law—almost all of 
which were brought about through legislative activity in the area.40 One 
consequence of the digital world, however, was its challenge to the traditional 
business models of participants in key information industries: music, movies, 
and, most recently, newsgathering and reporting. And it was precisely to 
protect these traditional models that the common law had been called into 
service, in the process moving it in new directions and into altogether new 
areas.41 This posed an obvious problem. The common law had emerged within 
certain contexts and developed concepts from within those contexts. As it 
came to be applied to new areas, its concepts no doubt remained facially 
adaptable. All the same, the reasons for their formal existence and validity 
started becoming less and less apparent. When this normally happens, a 
common law court usually has three main options: it can (i) create new law in 
an effort to take account of the new reasons and contexts, (ii) abdicate the 
doctrinal areas in question to the legislature on the theory that “[c]ourts are ill-
equipped”42 to the task, or (iii) proceed with caution, enabling the law to fully 
grapple with the new context, before moving in either direction. 
The court in Barclays Capital can be seen as adopting the third of these 
approaches. The court was no doubt aware of how the hot news doctrine had 
come to be applied to new contexts, including the Internet, and was invoked 
for interferences with traditional business models, especially by the newspaper 
industry. Yet, it certainly did nothing at all to expand the doctrine or to adapt it 
to the new circumstances. Neither did it fully abrogate the doctrine, and return 
all intellectual property lawmaking to the legislature. Instead, the court 
effectively hit the pause button on the continued expansion of the doctrine in 
order to allow participants (and indeed the law as a whole) to grapple more 
fully with the changed environment. 
Caution has long been known to be a virtue of the common law.43 The 
experimentation that incremental lawmaking allows for remains valuable only 
 
40. See,	  e.g.,	  Glynn	  S.	  Lunney,	   Jr.,	  The	  Death	  of	  Copyright:	  Digital	  Technology,	  Private	  
Copying,	   and	   the	   Digital	   Millennium	   Copyright	   Act,	   87	   Va.	   L.	   Rev.	   813	   (2001)	   (exploring	  
impact	  of	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  on	  copyright	  protection).	  
41. See	  Shyamkrishna	  Balganesh,	  Common	  Law	  Property	  Metaphors	  on	   the	   Internet:	  
The	  Real	  Problem	  with	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Cybertrespass,	  12	  Mich.	  Telecomm.	  &	  Tech.	  L.	  Rev.	  
265	  (2006)	  (studying	  extension	  and	  application	  of	  common	  law	  doctrines	  in	  property	  law	  to	  
cybertrespass).	  
42. International	  News	  Service	  v.	  Associated	  Press,	  248	  U.S.	  215,	  267	  (1918)	  (Brandeis,	  
J.,	  dissenting).	  
43. Balganesh,	   Pragmatic	   Incrementalism,	   supra	   note	   39,	   at	   1568–74	   (promoting	  
positive	  characteristic	  of	  pragmatic	  incrementalism	  is	  caution	  in	  light	  of	  uncertainty).	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if it allows for the process to periodically revisit its basic premises and change 
direction, or slow things down under conditions of uncertainty. Disentangled 
from its formal rhetoric, Barclays Capital is a strikingly good example of this 
happening in the world of common law intellectual property. 
B. The Bi-Directionality of Common Law Incrementalism in Intellectual 
Property 
While incremental lawmaking remains a hallmark of the common law, its 
advantages are often thought to be offset by a heightened amount of path 
dependence that is intrinsic to the process.44 Principles such as stare decisis, 
and the rules of precedent and authority are thus thought to ensure that even 
when the law develops gradually, it does so in one particular direction, without 
ever allowing for a measured rollback. Creativity in adjudication is believed to 
be fraught with the possibility that later courts will come to mechanically 
follow suit, for no reason other than that the law exists.45 This is in turn 
thought to be especially problematic in relation to intellectual property and the 
creation of entitlements in informational resources, given the rapidity with 
which the interests and needs of society in the area tend to fluctuate. In rolling 
back the hot news misappropriation doctrine, Barclays Capital shows that this 
need not be true—and that lawmaking in the common law style is truly a two-
way street, even in the area of intellectual property. 
Concerns about path dependence and unidirectional development in the 
common law all too easily disregard the reality that the common law is more 
than just an adaptable body of law—it is also a malleable process. What this 
means is that the process of reasoning that common law courts employ derives 
from a multiplicity of sources, some formal and others substantive. The precise 
mix and hierarchy of these sources, however, remains the prerogative of the 
common law judge, and the astute common law judge, as a pragmatist 
grounded in the realities of society, is meant to find a way to reach the decision 
deemed most appropriate to the situation and context.46 Common law 
rulemaking is thus hardly mechanical in nature, and indeed very rarely admits 
of a single “right” answer (though it may readily admit of several “wrong” 
ones). Embedded within the process are a number of important procedural 
safeguards, all of which are directed at endowing the judge with the flexibility 
needed to overcome a path dependent form of decisionmaking. The 
holding/dicta distinction is a particularly important one, and Barclays Capital 
all too readily seized on it. Another similar well-known device is the process of 
distinguishing a case based on its facts. 
 
44. See	  Oona	  A.	   Hathaway,	   Path	  Dependence	   in	   the	   Law:	   The	   Course	   and	   Pattern	   of	  
Legal	   Change	   in	   a	   Common	   Law	   System,	   86	   Iowa	   L.	   Rev.	   601,	   603	   (2001)	   (using	   path	  
dependence	  theory	  to	  explore	  “the	  influence	  of	  history	  in	  our	  common	  law	  system”).	  
45. See	   Oliver	  Wendell	   Holmes,	   The	   Path	   of	   the	   Law,	   10	   Harv.	   L.	   Rev.	   457,	   468–69	  
(1897)	  reprinted	   in	  110	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  991,	  1001	  (1997).(describing	   this	  phenomenon	  and	  
critiquing	  it).	  
46. Benjamin	  Nathan	  Cardozo,	  The	  Nature	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Process,	  in	  Selected	  Writings	  
of	  Benjamin	  Nathan	  Cardozo:	  The	  Choice	  of	  Tycho	  Brahe	  107,	  108–13	   (Margaret	  Hall	   ed.,	  
1967).	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Consequently, common law intellectual property lawmaking need not be a 
one way street that favors expansionism and the grant of private entitlements at 
the cost of the public domain, or indeed one that does not allow for a pre-
existing entitlement framework to be dismantled retrospectively if necessary. 
Barclays Capital serves to illustrate this reality. The Demsetzian account of 
legal rules, under which a regime develops when the benefits that it generates 
for actors outweigh its costs, has long struggled to identify a good example of 
its reversibility, i.e., a situation where a legal regime comes to be dismantled 
when its costs outweigh its benefits.47 Barclays Capital might suggest that hot 
news misappropriation doctrine is one. 
CONCLUSION: SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS	  	  
 The Second Circuit’s opinion in Barclays Capital unquestionably centers 
around two important messages: one, that the hot news misappropriation 
doctrine should not be readily extended to new contexts and situations; and 
two, that the doctrine may well be on the tail-end of its lifecycle. At the same 
time though, in failing to engage with some of the broader, structural issues 
relating to the doctrine more directly, the opinion leaves several rather 
important, and functionally significant, questions open and unanswered. 
First, the court consciously avoids telling us what the structural basis of 
the doctrine was and is. While this may have been of secondary importance in 
light of the court’s own cabining of the doctrine, it nonetheless remains 
functionally relevant until such time as the doctrine is completely abrogated—
especially since the court’s own opinion leaves open the possibility that a 
future court might resurrect the doctrine when needed. The court refrains from 
describing the interest in “property” terms, and instead characterizes it as a 
“tort.”48 Yet, this presents its own set of analytical complications—involving 
the identification of a domain of wrongdoing, wrongfulness, and harm, none of 
which the court had to grapple with. In my previous work, I characterized 
courts’ analytical description of the hot news doctrine in property terms as the 
“enduring myth” that the doctrine had been developed to create property rights 
in the news. In his response to my piece, Professor Richard Epstein disagreed 
that there was indeed any enduring myth about the doctrine’s property status, 
and noted that courts and scholars have come to understand that a “monolithic 
conception” of property could not explain the hot news doctrine.49 Whether the 
myth has indeed been dispelled or not, Barclays Capital moves the question 
into the realm of a continuing mystery, by at once both disagreeing with the 
decision in NBA (that had treated the doctrine as a “property” based one), and 
failing to explicate the basis for the doctrine independently. 
 
47. See	   Thomas	   W.	   Merrill,	   Introduction:	   The	   Demsetz	   Thesis	   and	   the	   Evolution	   of	  
Property	   Rights,	   31	   J.	   Legal	   Stud.	   S331,	   S337	   (2002)	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   question	   of	   whether	   legal	  
regime	  may	  be	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  if	  “benefits	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  or	  costs	  rise”).	  
48. Barclays	  Capital	  Inc.	  v.	  Theflyonthewall.com,	  650	  F.3d	  876,	  890	  (2d	  Cir.	  2011).	  
49. Richard	  A.	   Epstein,	   The	  Protection	   of	   “Hot	  News”:	   Putting	  Balganesh’s	   “Enduring	  
Myth”	  about	  International	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  Service	  v.	  Associated	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  Rev.	  
Sidebar	  79,	  79	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Second and perhaps more importantly, Barclays Capital does not address 
the First Amendment and free speech implications of the hot news doctrine, 
either directly or indirectly. Despite the defendant’s raising the issue on appeal, 
and indeed several amicus briefs making it the focus of their interventions,50 
the court seems to have thought it wholly unnecessary to its decision—given 
its avowed doctrinal focus on the question of federal copyright preemption. 
Whether and how the First Amendment influences the doctrine is more than 
just an academic question, and indeed ties back to the analytical basis of the 
doctrine.51 It may well have been that the First Amendment was not implicated 
in the dispute, once the court found the plaintiff’s claim to have been 
preempted altogether by copyright law. Nonetheless, given the court’s refusal 
to abrogate the doctrine in its entirety, the question is sure to resurface in the 
future, if the doctrine were ever successfully relied on in the narrow set of 
cases for which the court seemed to let it survive. Given its reexamination of 
the roots of the doctrine, the court in Barclays Capital would have done well to 
address the First Amendment question, even if only in dicta. 
Sadly enough then, despite its extensive discussion of the doctrine, its 
origins, and its future, the court in Barclays Capital fails to address what are 
perhaps two of the most complex and important issues relating to the doctrine. 
Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the case is a perfect illustration of the “genius 
of the common law”52 as a process of incremental, context-specific rule 
development that over time works itself pure and allows for adaptation as the 
particular needs of society change. 
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